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 Abstract 
We examine the firm-level and country-level determinants of the currency denomination of 
small business loans. We introduce an information asymmetry between banks and firms in a 
model that also features the trade-off between the cost of debt and firm-level distress costs. 
Banks in our model don’t know the currency in which firms have contracted their sales. 
When foreign currency funds come at a lower interest rate, all foreign currency earners and 
those local currency earners with low distress costs choose foreign currency loans. With 
imperfect information in the model concerning the currency in which the firms receive their 
earnings, even more local earners switch to foreign currency loans as they do not bear the 
full cost of the corresponding credit risk. 
We test these implications of our model by using a 2005 survey with responses from 9,655 
firms in 26 transition countries that contains reports on 3,105 recent bank loans. We find 
that firms with foreign currency earnings and lower distress costs borrow more in foreign 
currency, while opaque firms do not. Interest rate advantages on foreign currency funds do 
explain differences in loan dollarization across countries, but not within countries over 
time. The presence of foreign banks and reforms related to corporate governance also 
contribute to differences in foreign currency borrowing across countries. However, stronger 
foreign bank presence or corporate governance do not lead more local currency earners to 
choose foreign currency loans. 
Our results suggest that while the cost and risk of debt do affect the propensity of small 
firms to take unhedged foreign currency loans, firm opaqueness does not. Hence, we cannot 
confirm that information asymmetries are a key driving force of the recently observed 
increase in loan dollarization in Eastern European transition countries. 
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I. Introduction 
A large theoretical and empirical literature investigates the conditions on bank loans 
to small businesses, such as their loan rate, loan amount, collateral, and maturity for 
example (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1992), Jiménez, Salas and Saurina 
(2006), Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005), respectively, among many 
others). The currency denomination of these loans has been somewhat overlooked however. 
In many countries foreign currency borrowing seems quite common however. In 
Eastern European countries between one-fifth to three quarters of all corporate loans are 
currently denominated in foreign currency (European Central Bank (2006), p. 39). In East 
Asia corporate debt seems split about equally between domestic and foreign currencies 
(Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003)), while in more than a few Latin American 
countries the share of foreign currency debt exceeds 20 percent (Galindo, Panizza and 
Schiantarelli (2003)). 
The expected introduction of the euro and increasing trade flows may well explain 
part of the loan currency choices made in Eastern Europe for example. But households and 
firms increasingly also take out mortgages or commercial loans in Swiss francs and 
Japanese Yen, rather than in the domestic currency, to take advantage of substantially lower 
interest rates on these foreign currencies (Wall Street Journal, May 29th, 2007). These 
"small men’s carry-trades" could raise concerns about the resultant credit risks,1 especially 
                                                 
1 Carry trades, whereby investors borrow in a low-yielding currency and invest in a high-yielding one, are a 
widespread phenomenon. At the beginning of 2007 it was estimated that that as much as US$1 trillion was 
involved in the yen carry trade for example (The Economist, February 1st, 2007). Traditionally carry trades 
have been made by large financial institutions and leveraged institutions, such as hedge funds. Low exchange 
rate volatility and persistent interest rate differentials have fuelled the growth in cross-currency positions in 
recent years (Galati, Heath and McGuire (2007)). 
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in those situations where financiers are unable to assess the actual foreign currency needs of 
their borrowers. 
This paper therefore more closely examines the currency denomination of loans to 
small businesses. Very little is known about the attraction and characteristics of borrowing 
in low-yielding currencies by this key segment of the economy. A number of recent 
theoretical papers however have started to model the choice of loan currency in a way that 
may also be relevant for small firms (Allayannis et al. (2003)). The tradeoff between 
management of currency risk and cost of debt may be shaped by firm financial constraints 
as in Cowan (2006) for example. Firms with more foreign income and firms in countries 
with a higher interest differential will have more foreign debt, but the match between 
income streams and denomination of debt is naturally tighter for more financially 
constrained firms. 
Motivated by the aforementioned policy concerns, we introduce an information 
asymmetry between banks and firms in a framework that also features the trade-off between 
the risk and the cost of debt. We conjecture that banks don’t know the currency in which 
firms have contracted their sales. In emerging economies for example – economies where 
many transactions are denominated in foreign currency and loan currency choice may be 
acute – small firms often borrow from banks without providing any audited statements, 
while cash management services that would allow banks to verify and analyze firm 
revenues are not commonly used. If the interest rate on foreign currency funds is lower, 
local currency earners with low distress costs vis-à-vis the interest rate differential choose 
foreign currency loans. Our model shows that if the banks are imperfectly informed about 
the currency in which the firms earn, more local earners switch to foreign currency loans, as 
firms do not bear the full cost of the corresponding default risk. 
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We test these implications of our theoretical model by investigating the currency 
denomination of individual bank loans granted to small firms. We use a 2005 survey of 
9,655 firms from 26 transition countries that yields 3,105 actual bank loan observations in 
an synthetic panel that runs from January 2002:I to 2005:II. Motivated by our theoretical 
framework we focus on the interplay between firm-specific measures of firm distress costs 
and the informational asymmetry. 
We find that small businesses that have export revenues or foreign owners are more 
likely to borrow in foreign currency. However, firms without foreign income (domestically-
owned, non-exporting companies in non-dollarized economies) also take foreign currency 
loans. These firms are more likely to do so the lower their distress costs and the higher the 
interest rate differential between the local and foreign currency funds. Consequently, the 
trade off between debt risk and cost influences the choice of loan currency denomination by 
small firms in transition countries. In contrast, we do not find that our measures of financial 
opaqueness determine the likelihood firms take loans in foreign currency (that are most 
likely unhedged). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Section III introduces the main hypotheses, ingredients and specifics of 
our theoretical model. Section IV describes the data and the empirical model, while Section 




A number of recent papers model the choice of the loan currency denomination by 
firms borrowing from financial institutions or investors (see Allayannis et al. (2003) for 
example for a pointed review). Managing the risk from economic exposure clearly matters 
for this choice: if the firm’s cash flows are in foreign currency, borrowing in the same 
foreign currency will provide a straightforward natural hedge (Goswami and Shrikhande 
(2001)).2 
Firms may choose for the lowest cost debt, as static capital structure trade-off theory 
suggests. The interest rate differential, i.e., deviations from the uncovered interest rate 
parity, is then the second main determinant of the choice of the loan currency denomination 
by the firm (Graham and Harvey (2001)).3 
These two elements, i.e., the management of currency risk and the cost of debt, can be 
traded off as in Cowan (2006) for example. His model predicts that firms with more foreign 
income and firms in countries with a higher interest differential (foreign currency funds are 
cheaper) will have more foreign debt. His model further shows that firms that are more 
financially constrained (i.e., experience a higher risk premium when borrowing from a 
bank) are more likely to match the denomination of debt to income streams. These firms 
                                                 
2 Mian (1996), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), Brown (2001) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), among 
others, analyze the hedging of foreign currency exposure, using forward contracts and derivatives for example. 
3 Our theoretical framework and accompanying empirical analysis will focus on small firms in emerging 
economies. Consequently, we don’t discuss: (1) International taxation issues such as tax loss carry forwards 
and limitations on foreign tax credits; (2) The possibilities for international income shifting; (3) The 
differential costs across countries of derivatives to create synthetic local debt; and (4) Clientele effects in 
issuing public bonds. These issues are clearly important when analyzing the debt structure of large 
corporations. 
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would have to borrow at higher costs if they become financially distressed due to the 
accumulated currency mismatches. If a bank knows a firm is mismatched it may pass on the 
corresponding expected default costs immediately. 
The framework in Cowan (2006) is also relevant for small firms. Small firms that 
have foreign currency earnings can be expected to borrow in these foreign currencies. Very 
small and highly levered firms, on the other hand, may have less foreign currency debt 
because the potential for financial distress for these firms is higher. Our own theoretical 
model features not only the trade-off between the risk and the cost of debt, present in 
Cowan (2006), but introduces a very specific but relevant information asymmetry between 
banks and firms. We conjecture banks don’t know the currency in which firms have 
contracted their sales. We motivate this conjecture further when we discuss our model. 
The information asymmetry for the financiers in Jeanne (2000) concerns the effort 
level of the exporting entrepreneurs. Exporters borrow locally in domestic or foreign 
currency. But borrowing in foreign currency features as a commitment device: The 
entrepreneurs’ incentives to produce effort are stronger under foreign currency debt, 
because a failure to achieve high returns is automatically sanctioned by termination. 
Consequently, lenders may require a lower interest rate on foreign currency loans, and 
entrepreneurs may choose to borrow in foreign currency in equilibrium if the expected cost 
of early termination is more than offset by the lower loan rate that they obtain on foreign 
currency debt. 
In contrast to Jeanne (2000), in which firms have only foreign revenues, in our model 
firms have domestic or foreign currency earnings. In Jeanne (2000) entrepreneurial effort is 
unobservable to the financiers; in our model the currency in which sales are contracted and 
sales revenues are collected cannot be observed by the bank. Finally, Jeanne (2000) focuses 
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on the macro policy choices,4 while our model focuses on firm decisions (which we can test 
as we have access to firm level data). 
B. Empirical Work 
A number of studies analyze the currency denomination of debt of large corporations 
within a single country. Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) for example study large US 
corporations. These firms match loan to sales currencies, they discover. But they find no 
evidence that tax arbitrage, market liquidity, or legal regime matters for the currency choice 
of these corporations. Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) study 44 large Finnish corporations 
and document not only currency matching, but also evidence of carry-trade (i.e., borrowing 
in the low interest rate currency). Large Chilean and Mexican corporations for example also 
currency match (Benavente, Johnson and Morande (2003), Cowan, Hansen and Herrera 
(2005), Gelos (2003)). Clark and Judge (2007) critically review these and other studies. 
Not many studies have had access to firm level panel (country, time) data that is 
essential to investigate the link between loan currency denomination and firm 
characteristics, controlling for macro and institutional variables. A study by Allayannis et 
al. (2003) is an exception. Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth, Aivazian, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), Allayannis et al. (2003) investigate the capital 
                                                 
4 Domestic currency debt allows the policymaker in the model to insure the productive sector against bad 
shocks. If returns are low, the policymaker avoids terminations by setting the exchange rate at the lowest 
possible level. Macro explanations for corporate foreign currency debt seem less relevant for our sample: (1) 
The domestic financial markets in the local currency may be underdeveloped in liquidity (Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2003)) and offering only short maturity debt. The small firms in our sample however borrow 
mostly from banks. Bank loans typically have a short maturity (Berger et al. (2005), Ortiz-Molina and Penas 
(2007)). (2) Government may give free insurance to foreign currency borrowers through the fixed exchange 
rate regime or bail out. Foreign firm debt may even act as disciplining device for local government as after 
devaluation borrowers in foreign currency will be worse off. Firms may not take into account such an 
externality (Calvo (2001), Tirole (2003)) and mostly flexible exchange rate regimes in our sample countries. 
(3) Lenders may refuse to lend in the local currency, as they fear devaluation by local government to decrease 
value of their sovereign debt (the “original sin”). 
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structure of 327 of the largest East-Asian corporations, including foreign, local, and 
synthetic local (hedged) debt. They find that the ability to manage currency risk with risk 
management tools, interest rate differentials as well as asset type explain the use of foreign 
currency debt. A recent paper by Cowan (2006) investigating around 500 corporations in 
half a dozen Latin American countries arrives at similar findings. 
Complementing these empirical studies, we investigate the currency denomination of 
recent individual bank loans granted to small firms, rather than the currency denomination 
of outstanding corporate debt of large corporations. Informational asymmetries may play a 
more important role for small firms. Motivated by our theoretical framework we focus on 
interplay between firm-specific measures of firm distress costs and informational 
asymmetry. 
The dataset comprises survey data on 9,655 firms from 26 transition countries. While 
the transition in these countries may be interesting to study per se, more importantly for our 
purposes in transition countries small firms, informational asymmetries, and banks play a 
key role. In addition, the bank loans detailed in the dataset were granted during a period in 
which large changes in interest rate differentials, institutional arrangements, and banking 
sector characteristics (e.g., foreign ownership) took place across the countries that are 
covered. Consequently, this dataset may be well suited to study the decisions made by firms 
about the currency denomination of their bank loans, based on a theoretical framework that 
highlights firm distress costs and informational asymmetry. We develop this framework in 




Existing models demonstrate that the choice of loan denomination by firms is affected 
by the structure of firm revenues, interest rate differentials between local and foreign 
currency funds, and distress costs of firms when facing potential default (see Jeanne (2000), 
Allayannis et al. (2003), and Cowan (2006) for example). Missing in the theoretical 
literature so far is the modeling of the likely interplay between distress costs and the bank – 
firm informational asymmetry. 
We believe that a lack of information about the currencies that are employed by the 
firms corresponds to a real situation for many banks, especially in transition and developing 
countries, and especially when they target small firms. In general the currency 
denomination of firms' current and future sales contracts is often negotiated,5 and 
consequently may be a closely guarded secret. Moreover, banks may have difficulties or 
lack incentives to collect this detailed information,6 depending on bank type, size or 
ownership and the degree of competition in the banking sector.7 These costs of information 
acquisition are particularly high for small firms, who are less likely to have financial 
accounts (Berger and Udell (1998)). 
                                                 
5 Possibly as a consequence of firm risk aversion (Viaene and de Vries (1992)). Currency variability (Engel 
(2006) among others) and medium of exchange considerations (Rey (2001)) may also determine currency 
choice. 
6 Banks may similarly lack information on firm quality, project choice, or managerial effort for example 
incurring monitoring costs (Diamond (1984), Diamond (1991)) or forming relationships with the firms 
(Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), von Thadden (2004), Hauswald and Marquez (2006), Egli, Ongena and Smith 
(2006), or Black (2006), among others). 
7 Foreign banks may be less informed about the activities of local firms for example (Brown and Rueda 
Maurer (2005), Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008) and Giannetti and Ongena (2008a)), while intense 
competition between banks may make relationship banking more or less beneficial (Petersen and Rajan 
(1995), Boot and Thakor (2000), Elsas (2005) and Degryse and Ongena (2007)). 
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This situation is aggravated in developing and transition countries (Detragiache et al. 
(2008)), where weak company law implies that it is hard for banks to assess the credibility 
of available firm-level financial information (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000), Brown, 
Jappelli and Pagano (2007)). As a result, firms in developing and transition countries often 
borrow without having any audited statements (e.g., Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (2000)) 
and banks cannot verify firm sales information through advanced cash management 
services for example. Indeed, advanced cash management services are yet to be introduced 
in many of these countries either because banks don’t offer (e.g., Tsamenyi and Skliarova 
(2005)) and/or firms don’t require them (for example, in the survey we analyze one third of 
the firms report to receive less than one third of their income through their banks). 
We construct a simple model that clarifies how the choice of loan currency is 
determined by a firm’s distress costs and the bank’s lack of information about the firm’s 
revenue currency. Our model shows that if there is an interest rate differential in favor of 
foreign currency funds, local currency earners with low distress costs and all foreign 
currency earners will prefer foreign currency loans. In contrast, local currency earning firms 
with high distress costs will prefer local currency loans. If banks cannot identify the revenue 
currency of the firm, more local earners end up borrowing in foreign currency. 
Consequently, our model identifies the information asymmetry between lender and 
borrower as a so far overlooked driver of “dollarization” in credit markets. 
B. Assumptions 
Define te , the exchange rate at time t , to equal the amount of local currency per 
foreign currency, which is normalized at 0=t  to 10 =e . At 1=t  the local currency 
appreciates, α−= 11e  ( )10 << α , with probability p . It depreciates α+= 11e  with 
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probability p−1 . For simplicity we assume that 5.=p , so that the expected exchange rate 











Assume that each firm i  needs to invest 1=I  in local currency at 0=t . At 1=t  
locally earning firms L  have revenues in local currency LR  and foreign earning firms F  
have revenues in foreign currency FR , with an expected value in local currency of 
FF ReR =*1 .
8 For simplicity we assume that the expected earnings in local currency are 
identical for both firm types 1>== RRR FL . Let both firm types be physically located in 
the domestic country. Their owners will spend their profits locally, so firms care about their 
expected payoff in local currency. Firms maximize expected income and have no other 
wealth (and are thus limited liable).9 
Banks set prices simultaneously, charging a net interest rate ijr  to a firm of type 
},{ FLi ∈  on a loan in currency },{ flj ∈ . Banks have no capacity limits on local or 
foreign currency funds. The unit cost of local currency funds is 
Li while the cost of foreign 
currency funds is normalized to 0=fi . 
We assume that the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP) is not fulfilled, and that 
there is an interest rate advantage on foreign currency funding for the bank, i.e. 
                                                 
8 We assume that firms have either local or foreign currency revenues. The interpretation of our main results 
will not be qualitatively altered if firms sell in both currencies but in different proportions. 
9 While we assume that firms maximize expected income, their payoff is not linear in expected income due to 
our assumption of distress costs. The assumption of distress costs implies that firms care about income 
variance, as would be the case if we assumed firms were risk-averse. 
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0=∆+≥ eii fl . An extensive empirical research using a variety of methods typically finds 
that the uncovered interest rate parity condition rarely holds.10 
All payments to the bank (loan repayment and interest payments) are made at 1=t .11 
We assume that firms' earnings are verifiable ex post so that payments are enforceable if a 
firm has sufficient earnings. As firms' earnings are certain in the respective currency, a firm 
i  which takes a loan in the currency of its earnings, ij = , will not default as long as 
Rr ij ≤+1 . 
We assume, however, that exchange rate volatility is large enough so that a locally 
earning firm will always default if it takes a loan in foreign currency and the local currency 
depreciates: α+< 1R . Moreover, a foreign earning firm will always default if it takes a 
loan in the local currency and this currency appreciates: 1)1( <− Rα .12 
If firms default on a loan, they face costs of financial distress. For example, firms can 
find external financing henceforth only at penalty costs Cowan (2006). In this case distress 
costs C  may be proportional to or convex in the default amount (though still homogenous 
across firms). Alternatively, these costs may involve the private value of the firm to the 
owner that is lost, if the firm goes bankrupt, in the case of family-owned small firms for 
example (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993)).13 In this case C  will be independent of the 
default amount, but will be heterogeneous among firms. We assume this to be the case. For 
                                                 
10 For surveys of this literature, see Hodrick (1987), Froot and Thaler (1990), Lewis (1995), Engel (1996), and 
Isard (2006). 
11 Given our focus we do not derive the optimality of this debt contract (see Townsend (1979) for example). 
12 It is not uncommon following a deep depreciation of the local currency for small firms in developing 
countries to default on loans in foreign currency (e.g., Ziaul Hoque (2003)). Small firms and firms in 
developing countries rarely use derivatives to hedge their net currency exposure (see Briggs (2004), Børsum 
and Ødegaard (2005), and O'Connell (2005), among others). 
13 Corresponding to risk aversion of managers as in Stulz (1984) or of firms as in Conesa (1997) and Calvo 
(2001) for example. 
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simplicity we assume that distress costs in local currency units for both L and F firms are 
distributed uniformly on the range [ ]CCC i ,∈ . 
Given the above assumptions, the payoff ijv  in local currency to a firm of type i  

























































C. Perfect Information 
We first analyze bank and firm behavior when banks are perfectly informed about the 
revenue currency of each firm. Under this assumption each bank sets four interest rates: Llr  
for local earners taking a local currency loan, Lfr  for local earners taking a foreign currency 
loan, Ffr  for foreign earners taking a foreign currency loan, and 
F
fr  for foreign earners 




























































Due to perfect price competition the expected profit on each loan type will be zero. 













































Local currency earners will choose a local currency loan if Lf
L
l vv ≥ , while foreign 
earners will choose a local currency loan if Ff
F
l vv ≥ . Inserting equilibrium interest rates 
from [3] into [1], we obtain the following conditions for borrowers i to choose loans in their 
own currency: 
[4a] li iC 2≥   [local earners choose local currency loans] 
[4b] li iC 2−≥   [foreign earners choose foreign currency loans] 
Hence with perfect information currency choice is as follows: Foreign earners always 
choose foreign currency loans. However, as there is an interest rate advantage on foreign 
currency funds, 0=∆+> eii fl , not all local earners may choose local currency loans. 
Condition [4b] shows that the marginal local currency earner who will choose a local 
currency loan is the one with distress costs equal to: 
[5]  liC 2
infoperfect =   
All local currency earners with lower distress costs will choose foreign currency 
loans. We have assumed that distress costs are distributed uniformly on [ ]CCC i ,∈ . As a 
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result we obtain the equilibrium share of local currency earners, which choose foreign 



























infoperfect  δ . 
D. Imperfect Information 
We now introduce an information asymmetry between banks and firms about the 
revenue currency of the firm. We assume that banks know that a share [ ]1,0∈λ  of firms are 
local currency earners, but that they cannot identify which firms have local currency and 
which firms have foreign currency earnings. We further assume that firms cannot verifiably 
inform the banks about (or credibly commit to) a particular earnings currency. In general, 
the currency denomination of the future contracts for firms may also be uncertain,14 an issue 
our simple framework however does not directly address. 
All banks are equally affected by this information asymmetry in our model, 
irrespective of the currency they lend in. This assumption corresponds to the situation in the 
financial sector in Eastern Europe for example where most domestically located banks are 
observed to offer loans in both local and foreign currency. In contrast, in international 
renditions of the pecking order hypothesis,15 or in models with costly monitoring and an 
agency cost of debt,16 local and foreign financiers are different, in terms of monitoring cost 
                                                 
14 Loderer and Pichler (2000) surprisingly find that not even large Swiss firms accurately know their current 
currency exposure. 
15 In the pecking order hypothesis local financiers could have better information about the firm than foreign 
financiers. If all financiers lend only in their own currency, firms will borrow first in the local then in the 
foreign currency after having exhausted internal funds. 
16 Firms with a high monitoring cost in Diamond (1984) for example should borrow more locally in the local 
currency. If borrowing abroad, in the foreign currency, entails more regulatory scrutiny hence distress costs, 
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or scrutiny for example, and likely to lend only in their own currency. Consequently, it is 
not clear that these arguments unequivocally apply to small firms in many countries. 
Indeed, the small firms in our sample borrow locally in local and foreign currencies from 
both domestically and foreign-owned banks. 
We focus our analysis on equilibria in which a share of local currency earners 
[ ]1,0∈δ  choose foreign currency loans, while foreign currency earners choose only foreign 
currency loans (at the end of the section we derive conditions under which foreign currency 
earners will in equilibrium not choose local currency loans). We show that, ceteris paribus, 
more local currency earners take foreign currency loans under imperfect information, than 
under perfect information. The intuition behind this result is that, due to imperfect 
information local currency earners do not bear the full cost of credit risk induced by their 
choice of a foreign currency loan. 
With imperfect information concerning the currency in which firms earn their 
revenue, banks can no longer condition the interest rates on firm type. Banks thus only offer 
two rates: lr  for local currency loans and fr  for foreign currency loans. In this case the 





























Consequently, in the equilibrium, and with zero expected profit, interest rates must 
equal: 
                                                                                                                                                    
better firms in Ross (1977) will borrow in the foreign currency to signal their quality. In Jeanne (1999) and 






























f CivCrv ≥  will choose foreign 
currency loans. From [1] and [8] we see that this will be the case for all local currency 










−++= RiC l , 









From [9] we can establish that the lowest interest rate li  at which local currency 








. We assume 
from now on that: 
[10] 01 >+−≥ RRC α . 
This assumption ensures that unless there is a positive interest rate differential to the 
advantage of foreign currency funds, all local currency earners will choose local currency 
loans. The assumption prevents that local currency earners choose foreign currency loans 
due to limited liability even in the absence of an interest rate differential. We can further 











il , all local 
currency earners will choose foreign currency loans. 
                                                                                                                                                    
engaging in ‘excessive’ borrowing in the foreign currency. In Titman and Trueman (1986) foreign lenders are 
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For interest rate levels in the range, 















share 10 ≤≤ δ  of local currency earners will choose foreign currency loans under 
imperfect information. We can hereby establish that for each interest rate level the marginal 
firm that takes a foreign currency loan is characterized by higher distress costs under 
imperfect information than under perfect information. As the left hand side of [9] is 
increasing and the right hand side is decreasing in infoimperfect C , there is at most one level of 
infoimperfect 
C  for which condition [9] is met. Note further that at liC 2
infoimperfect =  the left hand 
side is less than the right hand side. As a consequence a unique equilibrium 
liC 2
infoimperfect >  exists, if for CC =infoimperfect  (and 1=δ ) the right hand side of the 











iC l . 
If condition [11] is met we can characterize the share of local currency earners that 
take foreign currency loans as follows: 
[12] 
( )









































Comparing conditions [12] and [6] we can conclude that more local currency 
earners will choose foreign currency loans under imperfect information than under perfect 
information. This main result of our model is illustrated by Figure 1 which depicts the 
distress costs of the marginal local currency firm which chooses a foreign currency loan 
                                                                                                                                                    
of a higher quality. 
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depending on the interest rate differential under both perfect (blue line) and imperfect 
information (red line). 
[Figure 1 here] 
We have assumed throughout this section that all foreign currency earners choose 
foreign currency loans. It remains to be shown that this will be the case in equilibrium. A 





f CivCrv ≥ . From [1] one can derive that this will always be the case if: 
[13] ( ) fl raRRiC 21 ++−>+ . 
Given our assumption [10] a sufficient condition for [13] to hold is:  
[14] fl ri 2> . 








 local currency earners take 
foreign currency loans. As a consequence the interest rate charged on foreign currency loans 
fr depends positively on the share of local currency earners in the population λ , on the 
share of these firms which choose foreign currency loans ),,( CCilδ , and banks potential 
credit risk from these unhedged foreign currency loans ( )R−+α1 . Thus, an equilibrium in 
which foreign currency firms always choose foreign currency loans will exists, as long as 
the following implicit condition holds for all interest rate levels li : 
[15] ),,,(2
−+−++
> RCiri lfl αλ . 
E. Empirical Predictions 
Our model above yields several testable hypotheses, regarding firm-level choice of 
loan denomination. As predicted by existing models (Jeanne (2000), Allayannis et al. 
(2003), and Cowan (2006) for example), the choice of a foreign currency loan (by local 
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currency earners) should be positively related to firm-level distress costs. This is illustrated 
in Figure 1, which shows that a higher interest rate differential is required to motivate firms 
with higher distress costs to take foreign currency loans. 
Our model further predicts that the choice of a foreign currency loan is positively 
related to the share of income a firm earns in foreign currency. Under the assumptions of 
our model, all foreign currency earners choose foreign currency loans, irrespective of the 
interest rate differential and firm-level distress costs, so that the share of foreign earning 
firms taking foreign currency loans is always at least as high as that of local earning firms. 
Our model also suggests that there are important interaction effects between income 
structure and distress costs. The impact of distress costs on loan denomination should be 
stronger the lower the share of income a firm receives in foreign currency. 
A key prediction of our model is that the choice of a foreign currency loan by local 
currency earners should be positively related to the opaqueness of a firm's revenue 
structure. Under imperfect information more local currency earners firms choose foreign 
currency loans than under perfect information. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the fact that 
the marginal distress costs for a firm to choose a foreign currency loan under imperfect 
information are higher those under perfect information. Note further, that the impact of 
information opaqueness is stronger for firms with higher shares of revenue in local 
currency. Our model suggests that imperfect information does not alter the currency choice 
for firms with foreign currency earnings only. 
At the macroeconomic level, our model predicts that the choice of a foreign 
currency loan (by local currency earners) will be positively related to the interest rate 
advantage on foreign currency funds. The impact of the interest rate differential does 
however depend on firm characteristics. The reaction to an increase in the interest rate 
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differential should be stronger for firms with less income in foreign currency. Firms who 
earn all their income in foreign currency choose foreign currency loans, even if the interest 
rate differential is zero. Moreover we predict that the reaction to an increase in the interest 
rate differential is weaker for opaque firms than for transparent firms. This is illustrated by 
the weaker slope of the line depicting marginal distress costs under imperfect information 
in Figure 1. Note further, that we predict a negative interaction effect between interest rate 
differential and distress costs. Local currency earners with very high distress costs will 
always choose local currency loans, no matter how high the interest rate differential is. 
IV. Data and Empirical Model 
Firm-level loan information is obtained from the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank jointly conducted this survey in 1999, 2002 and 
2005. Our analysis is based on the 2005 version as it contains the most comprehensive 
information on the borrowing behavior of the firms. 
In a first step we relate this information to firm-level indicators of revenue sources, 
distress costs and opaqueness taken from the same survey. In a second step we relate our 
firm-level loan information to country-level indicators of interest rate differentials, 
exchange rate volatility, and banking sector structure, taken from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Transition Report published by the EBRD, as well as from Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and 
Jurgilas (2007). The definitions and data sources for all variables used in our empirical 
analysis are presented in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
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A. Firm-Level Borrowing Behavior 
BEEPS 2005 provides data on 9,655 firms in 26 transition countries and covers a 
representative sample of firms for each of these countries.17 In this sample, 4,062 firms 
report they obtained a loan from a financial institution. Firms with outstanding bank credit 
provide many details on their most recent loan. Most important for our analysis, the survey 
includes an indicator of the currency denomination of the loan. Each firm states whether its 
most recent loan was denominated in local or foreign currency. The answer to this question 
is our dependent variable Forex loan that takes the value of one if the most recent loan was 
denominated in a foreign currency and zero if the most recent loan was in local currency. 
The survey further lists the precise date the loan was received and information on 
collateralization, duration, and interest rate.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics of loan characteristics for our sample by country. 
We exclude all observations for which the firm did not indicate the currency denomination 
(346 observations) and for which loans were received earlier than January 2002.18 We are 
left with 3,105 observations. In this sample, 25% of the loans are denominated in foreign 
currency. However, the share of foreign currency loans varies significantly across countries, 
from less than 10% in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Bosnia, and Uzbekistan to 
more than 50% in Albania and Georgia. 
[Table 2 here] 
Average loan duration in our sample is 29 months, again with considerable variation 
across countries. The overwhelming majority of loans in most countries are collateralized, 
                                                 
17 The survey covers all countries in which the EBRD is operational, with the exception of Turkmenistan. See 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm for detailed information on BEEPS 2005. 
18 Rejections of loan applications may create a selection issue that may vary across quarter. We cannot know 
the actual loans applications hence have to assume the choice of currency is unaffected. 
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with only four countries having collateralization rates of less than 80%. In contrast, the 
mean ratio of the amount of collateral to loan size varies substantially across countries from 
less than 100% in Slovenia and Uzbekistan to more than 200% in Bosnia. Not surprisingly 
for our sample of transition countries the cost of credit is substantial: the mean (nominal) 
interest rate exceeds 14% per annum. Pair wise correlations displayed in panel C of the 
table suggest that loan currency denomination is related to other loan characteristics. 
Foreign currency loans have a longer duration and, not surprisingly for the countries 
covered, lower interest rates than local currency loans. 
B. Firm-Level Determinants of Loan Currency Denomination 
We start our empirical analysis by studying the firm-level determinants of loan 
currency choice. In our empirical model, the dependent variable tjiForexLoan ,,)Pr( is the 
probability that firm i in country j chooses a foreign currency denomination when receiving 
a loan at time t: 
[15] tjitjiitjtji LFForexLoan ,,,,,,, 21)Pr( εββα +⋅+⋅+= . 
Our theoretical section above suggests that a firm's choice of a foreign currency loan 
should be related to the currency denomination of its revenues, the expected distress costs if 
it were to default on the bank loan, and the financial transparency of its activities. Our 
empirical model therefore includes a vector of firm-level indicators Fi from BEEPS 2005 
that captures corresponding firm-level characteristics. 
1. Revenue Currency 
We use four indicators of firm's revenue currency denomination. The dummy variable 
Exporter, equals one if the firm exports and zero if the firm only obtains revenues from 
domestic sales. In countries where domestic sales are conducted exclusively in domestic 
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currency, we believe that this dummy variable is a good indicator of whether a firm has 
foreign currency income or not. 
However, many of the countries in our sample display a strong degree of 
"dollarization", i.e. many domestic transactions are also conducted in foreign currency. To 
take this into account we include two firm-level indicators of the extent of domestic sales in 
foreign currency. The variable Sales to multinationals equals one if the firm makes 
domestic sales to multinational or foreign owned companies. Such sales are more likely to 
be made in foreign currency. 
In addition to current sales, assets in foreign currency could be an additional potential 
source of foreign currency cash flows. The BEEPS survey does not provide us with detailed 
information on the asset structure of firms. We therefore use foreign firm ownership as an 
indicator of whether firms have assets that yield foreign currency cash flow. The variable 
Foreign firm equals one if more than 50% of the firm's ownership is in foreign hands, and 
equals zero otherwise. Foreign owned firms are more likely to have foreign currency loans 
as they are more likely to have foreign currency income. 
Our final indicator of revenue currency is the variable International accounting which 
equals one for all firms that apply international accounting standards (IAS or US GAAP), 
and equals zero otherwise. Our conjecture is that firms with stronger relations to foreign 
markets or investors are more likely to apply international accounting standards. 
2. Distress Costs 
We also include four indicators of distress costs that occur when firms default on their 
most recent bank loan. Theory suggests that distress costs related to foreign currency 
borrowing may be larger for small firms, at least in proportion to loan size (Froot et al. 
(1993)). We therefore include the variable Small firm that equals one for firms with less 
 24
than 50 employees and equals zero otherwise. This dummy is our first indicator of distress 
costs. 
Theory further suggests that expected distress costs are higher for entrepreneurs 
deriving more private intangible value from their firm. This value may be lost if these firms 
default. Expecting that this private value is higher for sole proprietorships or family owned 
businesses, we include the variable Family firm. This dummy variable equals one if the firm 
is a sole proprietorship or a family owned business and equals zero otherwise. 
A further indicator of private intangible value is the variable Security costs, which 
measures the percentage of annual sales which firms pay for security related services. We 
predict that the private value of running a business may be lower in a less secure 
environment, and thus where security costs are higher. 
Theory finally suggests that highly leveraged firms have higher distress costs as they 
face higher costs of accessing additional external finance (Cowan (2006)). Our final 
indicator of distress costs, Debt, therefore relies on a measure of firm-leverage available 
from BEEPS 2005, i.e. the share of working capital financed by debt. 
3. Opaqueness 
Our theoretical model suggests that loan denomination may further be related to the 
degree of opaqueness about the firms' revenue sources. If banks cannot identify the revenue 
source of a firm, our theory suggests that some local currency earners may pretend to be 
foreign exchange earners in order to receive a cheaper foreign currency credit. As a result, 
firm opaqueness may lead to a higher probability of taking foreign currency loans if a 
corresponding interest rate advantage exists. 
On the other hand, one may observe that foreign currency loans are made available 
only to firms for which banks have reliable revenue information. Though not explicitly 
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modeled, more severe information asymmetry for example could lead to a collapse of the 
foreign currency credit market, at least for a set of firms that would be identifiably opaque. 
In this case firm opaqueness may lead to a lower probability of taking foreign currency 
loans. 
We include three firm-level indicators of opaqueness in our analysis. Our first 
indicator is based on firms' financial reporting standards. The variable Audited firm equals 
one for all firms with an external auditor and equals zero otherwise. Our conjecture is that 
firms with audited accounts are in the position to provide more credible information about 
their revenue sources to banks. 
Our second indicator of firm opaqueness, Income via bank, measures the share of the 
firm’s sales that are settled through a bank account. We expect that banks are better 
informed about the revenues sources of firms, the higher this share (à la Mester, Nakamura 
and Renault (2007) and Norden and Weber (2007)). 
Our final indicator of firm opaqueness is firm Age, measured in 2005. We hereby 
follow a standard argument in the literature that information about a firm’s activities 
becomes more accurate and credible, as the firm grows older and can provide a longer 
public track record. 
In addition to the firm revenue, distress costs and opaqueness variables we also 
include sector dummies to control for any other differences in firm characteristics.19 We 
further include two characteristics of each loan Li,t. The variable Duration measures the 
duration of the loan in months at origination, while the variable Collateralized equals one if 
the loan is collateralized, and zero otherwise. We assume banks determine duration and 
                                                 
19 We classify each firm into one of the following seven sectors based on where it obtains the largest 
percentage of its revenues: Mining; Construction; Manufacturing; Transport and communication; Wholesale, 
retain and repairs; Real estate; and Hotels and restaurants. 
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collateral prior to currency. Dropping both loan variables does not alter our findings 
however. 
4. Summary Statistics 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our eleven firm-level explanatory variables 
(statistics for the two loan characteristics were already provided in Table 2). The table 
displays full sample means for each variable, and then compares means for the firms with 
local / foreign currency loans separately. The table suggests that firms with foreign currency 
loans differ systematically from those with local currency loans. As expected firms with 
foreign currency loans are much likely to have export income and sales to multinationals, 
foreign owners and international accounting standards. 
[Table 3 here] 
Note, though, that less than half of the firms with foreign currency loans have export 
income. This finding could suggest that many local currency earners are taking foreign 
currency loans that are most likely to be unhedged. Table 3 further shows that firms with 
foreign currency loans are less likely to be small firms, and make higher expenditures for 
security services, suggesting that their distress costs may lower. On the other hand, there 
seems to be little difference in family ownership and external debt between local currency 
and foreign currency borrowers. 
Our summary statistics suggest an ambiguous relation between financial transparency 
and currency denomination. On the one hand, firms with foreign currency loans are more 
likely to be audited. On the other hand, these firms are younger and have a lower share of 
their income flowing through bank accounts, suggesting less financial transparency. 
Panel B displays the pairwise correlations between the firm characteristics. While 
some of the revenue indicators are somewhat correlated – not unexpectedly – this is not the 
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case for the variables Security costs and Debt for example. Both variables are surprisingly 
uncorrelated with measures of currency revenue, both other distress cost indicators, and the 
three transparency variables. 
C. Country-Level Determinants of Loan Currency Denomination 
Our theoretical model predicts that the choice of loan denomination for a given firm 
will differ across countries according to the extent of the interest rate advantage on foreign 
currency funds. In addition, loan denomination may vary across countries due to differences 
in exchange rate volatility, banking sector structure, and the degree of dollarization. We 
control for these cross-country differences by introducing country-time fixed effects. As the 
country level determinants of loan denomination, especially the interest rate differentials 
and exchange rate volatility, may vary frequently, our analysis includes a separate intercept 
aj,t for each country j and quarter t during the period 2002:I to 2005:II. 
However, in a second empirical step we want to examine to what extent country-
specific characteristics help explain the variation in the choice of loan currency 
denomination across the countries in our sample. To do so we extend our empirical model 
with a vector of time varying country-level variables Cj,t: 
[16] tjitjtjiijtji CLFForexloan ,,,,,,, 321)Pr( εβββα +⋅+⋅+⋅+= . 
As not all country-specific characteristics are available for all countries and all 
quarters, in this second step we will have to rely on varying subsamples. 
1. Interest Rate Differentials 
Our main country-level explanatory variable is an indicator of the interest rate 
differential on local currency and foreign currency funds. As elaborated in our theory 
section we are hereby interested in the interest rate differential after taking into account 
 28
expected changes in the exchange rate, i.e., in departures from uncovered interest parity 
which constitute a real differential on interest rates between local currency and foreign 





tjtj eiiID ,,,, ∆−−= , 
where iLj,t and i
F
j,t are risk-adjusted interest rates on local currency and foreign 
currency loans in country j at time t, while ∆eXj,t, is the expected depreciation by borrowers 
of the local currency in country j at time t vis-à-vis a reference currency X. 
We use three indicators of this interest rate differential. Our first indicator of the 
interest rate differential is calculated using observed interest rates in the domestic and 
foreign financial sectors. Assuming free capital flows, the foreign currency lending rate in 
the domestic economy should be equal to the foreign currency lending rate abroad Xti  plus 







tjtj eRiiID ,,,, )( ∆−+−= . 
We label this measure the Interest differential – USrate indicator, because we 
calculate it using the domestic lending rate (quarterly average from IFS, line 60p), the 
interest rate on US treasury bills (IFS, line 60c), and the realized values of exchange rate 
depreciation vis-à-vis the dollar over the past 12 months prior to each quarter. As a measure 
of credit risk in country X, we use the yearly non-performing loan ratio per country (EBRD 
Transition report). 
Our two further indicators of the interest rate differential are taken from Basso et al. 
(2007). They obtain actual interest rate differentials between local currency and foreign 
currency surveying central banks in transition economies. Their survey allows them to 
compile monthly information on interest rate differentials on loans and deposits for 24 
 29
transition countries over the period 2000-2006. Unfortunately their direct measures of 
interest rate differentials are not available for all countries throughout the whole 
observation period. We nevertheless use their indicators, we label, Interest differential – 
loans and Interest differential – deposits where possible. 
2. Monetary Volatility 
Our theory suggests that local currency earning firms will be less likely to take foreign 
currency loans when exchange rate volatility is high. We include the variable Exchange rate 
volatility that measures the variance of month on month changes per currency in the real 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the US Dollar (taken from IFS). Again assuming perfectly myopic 
agents we take the actual variance in exchange rate movements for the past 12 months prior 
to each quarter. 
In our model we ignore uncertainty about domestic inflation. In reality, however, 
volatility in the domestic purchasing power of the local currency may affect borrowers loan 
choice. In a model of optimal portfolio choice Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) for example 
show that risk-averse borrowers will choose the currency composition of their liabilities 
taking into account the relative volatility of domestic inflation and the real exchange rate. 
As we predict above, foreign currency borrowing should decrease with volatility in the 
exchange rate. Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) however also show that foreign currency 
borrowing should increase with volatility of domestic inflation. 
We account for this by including in our estimations the variable Inflation volatility, 
which measures the variance of month on month changes in the domestic consumer price 
index (also taken from IFS). 
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3. Country Dollarization and Transparency 
We expect that the probability of a firm taking a foreign currency loan should be 
naturally related to the degree of real "dollarization" in its country. We therefore include a 
country-level explanatory variable that measures the degree to which the foreign currency is 
used in the local economy: the share of banking deposits that are held in foreign currency. 
This variable is obtained from Basso et al. (2007) and labeled Forex deposits. 
Our model predicts further that the ability of firms to borrow in foreign currency will 
be affected by the information of banks on the firm’s sources of revenues. However the 
information held by the banks may not only depend on the firm-level transparency, but also 
on the institutional and legal environment in which the banking sector operates. Foreign-
owned banks may have less knowledge about the activities of local firms (see, Detragiache 
et al. (2008), Giannetti and Ongena (2008a) and Giannetti and Ongena (2008b) for 
example). 
As one indicator of countrywide information asymmetries we therefore include two 
variables that capture the foreign presence in the banking sector. The variable Foreign 
banks measures the asset share of foreign controlled banks on a yearly basis per country, 
and is taken from the EBRD transition report. The variable Foreign liabilities measures the 
share of banks funding that is obtained abroad. This variable is again taken from Basso et 
al. (2007) who show that foreign funding of the banking sector has a significant positive 
effect on dollarization of lending in a country. 
Finally, informational asymmetries in the banking sector may also be affected by the 
extent to which the domestic company law promotes good corporate governance. We 
therefore include the EBRD Enterprise reform index, which measures on a yearly basis the 
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degree to which corporate governance meets international standards in each transition 
country. 
4. Summary Statistics 
Table 4 displays summary statistics for our macroeconomic explanatory variables. 
Panel A displays means of our macroeconomic indicators by country. This table reveals 
positive values of the interest rate differential in almost all countries independent of the 
indicator considered. This implies a widespread interest rate advantage of taking foreign 
currency loans rather than local currency loans in our sample. This interest rate advantage 
does however vary substantially across countries. 
[Table 4 here] 
Panel B of Table 4 further shows that there are substantial changes in the interest rate 
differential over time, but that the observed pattern strongly depends on the measure being 
used. The indicator variable Interest rate differential – USrate for example increases in the 
beginning of 2002 and continues to rise until the middle of 2004, to fall thereafter. In 
contrast there is little time variation in the two interest rate differentials obtained from 
Basso et al. (2007). This may be due to the fact that their panel data is unbalanced. Finally, 
Panel C displays the pairwise correlations. 
Table 5 displays summary statistics for our country-level indicators of the banking 
sector and institutional environment. The table shows that dollarization of the economy 
varies strongly across our sample. Half of the countries in the sample appear to be highly 
dollarized with shares of foreign currency deposits in the banking sector exceeding 50%. 
Foreign presence in the banking sector also varies strongly, with foreign banks controlling 
over 90% of assets in some countries (Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovak republic), and 
less than 10% in others (Azerbaijan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). 
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[Table 5 here] 
Panel B of Table 5 shows that dollarization dropped between 2002 and 2005, while 
foreign bank influence increased. Panel C displays the pairwise correlations. 
V. Results 
A. Firm-Level Determinants of Loan Currency Denomination 
1. Full Sample Results 
Table 6 provides full sample estimates when Forex loan is regressed on firm and loan 
characteristics. Column (1) reports estimates without accounting for country fixed effects. 
The model in column (2) includes country fixed effects, column (3) country-year effects, 
and column (4) country-quarter effects. Each regression also includes sector dummies. 
We report for all regressions the marginal effects at sample means based on probit 
estimations. Moreover, t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered at the country-level. 
[Table 6 here] 
The estimates displayed in Table 6 suggest that the choice of loan denomination is 
systematically related to the currency in which firms yield revenue. We focus on the results 
of column (4), as the other models yield similar estimates but have fewer effects included. 
Exporters, Foreign firms and firms with International accounting standards obtain more 
foreign currency loans. All three coefficients are also economically relevant. At the means 
of the other variables, the percentage foreign loans increases from 22% for non-exporters to 
31% for exporters (remember that around 25% of all loans in the sample were in foreign 
currency). Similarly, the percentage foreign loans increases from 22% for domestic 
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compared to 47% for foreign firms, and from 23% for firms which don't apply international 
accounting standards to 31% for those which do. 
Full sample estimates for our indicators of firm distress costs and opaqueness are 
mixed. As predicted we find a significant positive correlation between Security costs and 
loan denomination. Firms with higher security costs, which we argue have a lower private 
value of doing business, are more likely to take a foreign currency loans. However, this 
relation is not confirmed by our other three measures of distress costs (Small firm, Family 
firm, Debt). 
An interesting result is that in general firms with a longer public track record are less 
likely to take foreign loans. More than 27% of the loans of the new firms are in a foreign 
currency, while for firms of more than the mean age around 24% of loans are in the foreign 
currency. This result could indicate that in general more publicly available information 
about a firm decreases its possibilities to obtain bank loans in a foreign. However, this 
result is not confirmed by the coefficients obtained for Audited firm or Income via bank that 
are never statistically significant. 
Finally, loans with a longer maturity are more likely to be in a foreign currency. Only 
17% of one-month loans are denominated in a foreign currency, while 26% of three-years 
loans are. The coefficient on Collateralized on the other hand is not significant. 
2. Sample Splits 
The fact that our full sample results are mixed for indicators of distress costs and firm 
opaqueness is not too surprising. After all, our theoretical framework does not predict that 
these indicators should affect the loan denomination choice of all firms. We expect that 
distress costs and opaqueness should affect loan denomination only for firms who do not 
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have income in foreign currency. The fact that we grouping these firms with foreign 
currency earners in our full sample regressions, thus may explain why results are weak. 
Consequently, we try to isolate the ‘true’ local earners by splitting the sample 
according to firm-level income structure and the country-level degree of real dollarization. 
More specifically we define Non-forex firms to be those firms that have no export sales, no 
sales to multinationals, at most a minority foreign owner, and do not use international 
accounting standards. Forex firms are then all other firms Moreover, we define a Weakly 
dollarized economy to have a mean share of foreign exchange deposits in the banking 
system that is below 25% for the observation period. Moderate dollarized economies are 
defined as those with a share of foreign exchange deposits between 25% and 50%, while 
Strongly dollarized economies are those with a share of foreign exchange deposits 
exceeding 50%.. We report the results for the six corresponding subsamples in Table 7. We 
are particularly interested in the estimates for Nonforex firms in Weakly dollarized 
economies as reported in column (1) of the table. 
[Table 7 here] 
The results of our sample splits suggest that for firms without foreign currency 
income potential distress costs may matter more than is suggested by our full sample 
results. For Non-forex firms in Weakly dollarized economies we find that not only firms 
with high Security costs but also firms with high levels of external Debt are more likely to 
borrow in a foreign currency. Moreover, firm Debt does not affect loan denomination in any 
of the other 5 subsamples. These results are in line with our model predictions that firms 
with higher distress costs are more likely to obtain a foreign currency loan. 
In contrast our sample splits do not support the conjecture that firm-level opaqueness 
affects loan choice for local currency earners. None of our indicators of firm opaqueness 
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(Audited firm, Income via bank, Age) display a significant coefficient in column (1) of 
Table 7. Indeed, in contrast to our predictions, we find that firm Age affects loan choice for 
foreign currency earners, but not for local currency earners. These results suggest that a lack 
of financial transparency at the firm level is not a driver of foreign currency borrowing in 
transition countries. 
B. Country-Level Determinants of Loan Currency Denomination 
Next we investigate if the firms’ decisions to borrow in a foreign currency are related 
to country-level determinants, such as the interest rate differential, exchange rate volatility 
and foreign bank presence.  
1. Full Sample Results 
In Table 8 we report a full sample analysis, including our three measures of the 
Interest rate differential, the Exchange rate volatility, Inflation volatility, Forex deposits 
(the degree of dollarization), Foreign banks and liabilities, and Enterprise reform (the latter 
three variables capturing the degree of transparency in the economy). As indicated before 
we expect the interest rate differential to have a positive effect, exchange rate volatility a 
negative, inflation volatility a positive, dollarization a positive, foreign banks and liabilities 
a positive, and reform a negative effect. 
[Table 8 here] 
Columns (1) – (3) report coefficients for estimations without country fixed effects for 
each of our three measures of the interest rate differential. We find that the estimated 
coefficient is positive for two measures: Interest differential – Usrate and Interest 
differential – loans. However, while the impact of these measures of the interest rate 
differential is statistically significant, its economic relevance is weak, compared to our 
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firm-level results. A ten percent difference in the lending rate differential increases the 
probability of a foreign currency loan by between 1 and 7 percent. The coefficient for our 
third indicator of the interest rate differential Interest differential deposits is not significant. 
An explanation for this finding may be that while our first two indicators are based on 
direct comparisons of lending rates, this indicator is based on a comparison of underlying 
funding costs. The presence of market imperfections, such as substantial market power or 
widespread banking relationships could imply that this latter indicator is not an accurate 
measure of lending rate differentials. 
Columns (1)-(3) of table 8 show that only few of our other country-level explanatory 
variables yield significant results. As expected, Enterprise reform does seem to 
significantly reduce foreign currency borrowing. This result confirms our conjecture that 
improved corporate governance (at the country-level) reduces information asymmetries, and 
thus the ability of local currency earners to obtain foreign currency loans. Supporting this 
interpretation, we also find that Foreign banks, which may be less well informed than local 
banks, have a (weak) positive impact on foreign currency borrowing. This latter result may 
of course also be explained by the fact that foreign banks have better access to foreign 
currency funding. However, our results do not show that Foreign liabilities are positively 
related to foreign currency borrowing. 
In columns (4)-(6) we repeat our full sample analysis including country fixed effects. 
This allows us to establish whether our country-level variables affect loan choice not only 
across countries, but also within countries over time. We find that none of our indicators of 
the interest rate differential has a significant impact on loan choice once we include country 
fixed effects. This result suggests that while interest rate differentials may explain cross-
country differences in loan-dollarization, they cannot explain changes in dollarization 
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across time within a particular country. An alternative explanation is though, that firms may 
not that actively carry trade changes in interest rate differentials and that the differentials 
themselves may be correlated with other country-specific characteristics that determine 
currency choice. Our indicators of financial transparency (Foreign banks, Foreign 
liabilities, Enterprise reform) are also no longer significant, when we add the country fixed 
effects. 
2. Sample Splits 
We check the robustness of our country-level results by estimating coefficients for 
various subsamples. We expect that the impact of the interest rate differential on loan 
denomination choice should be stronger for local currency earners than for foreign currency 
earners. Moreover, if enterprise reform and foreign bank presence affect foreign currency 
borrowing by increasing (reducing) financial transparency, then their impact should also be 
stronger for local currency earners. In table 9 we again split our sample into Non-forex 
firms and Forex firms, as well by the degree of real dollarization for each country. Panel A 
of the table reports joint results for weakly and moderate dollarized countries, while panel B 
reports results for strongly dollarized countries.  
The results in panel A of table 9 show that our indicators of the interest rate 
differential have a positive impact on foreign currency borrowing for Non-forex firms in 
weakly and moderate dollarized countries. In contrast the impact of the interest rate 
differential is much weaker and less significant for Forex firms (columns 4-6). This finding 
confirms our predictions that the relative cost of debt should affect loan denomination 
choice in particular for local currency earners. Moreover it is supported by the results in 
panel B of table 9, which show only a weak (if any) impact of the interest rate differential 
on loan denomination choice in strongly dollarized countries. 
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The coefficients for Foreign banks and Enterprise reform in panel A of table 9 do not 
however confirm our conjecture that country level determinants of financial transparency 
affect the possibilities of local currency earners to borrow in foreign currency. We find that 
neither variable has a significant impact on loan denomination for Non-forex firms. We do 
however find that Foreign banks increases – and Enterprise reform decreases – foreign 
currency borrowing by Forex firms. This supports our full sample results that corporate 
governance and banking sector structure do affect loan dollarization. However, their impact 
is through making foreign currency loans more (less) available to firms who have foreign 
currency earnings, rather than affecting the possibilities of local currency earners to 
"imitate". 
VI. Conclusion 
Motivated by policy concerns about the credit risks resulting from unhedged foreign 
currency loans, especially in opaque financial environments, we investigate how an 
information asymmetry between banks and firms in a theoretical framework – that also 
features the trade-off between the risk and the cost of debt – may determine the currency 
denomination of bank loans to firms. Banks may not know the currency in which firms have 
contracted their sales. Foreign earners and local earners with distress costs that are small 
vis-à-vis the interest rate differential choose foreign currency loans if the foreign interest 
rate is lower. With imperfect information for the banks concerning the currency in which 
the firms earn, we show, more local earners switch to foreign currency loans. 
We then test these implications of our theoretical model by using a 2005 survey of 
9,655 firms from 26 transition countries. We find that firms with foreign currency earnings 
and lower distress costs borrow more in foreign currency. However, we find little evidence 
that opaque firms are more likely to borrow in foreign currency. At the country-level we 
 39
find that interest rate advantages on foreign currency funds do explain differences in loan 
dollarization across countries, but not within countries over time. Finally, we find that the 
presence of foreign banks and corporate governance reforms do explain differences in 
foreign currency borrowing across countries. However, in contrast to the predictions of our 
model, stronger foreign bank presence or corporate governance only affects borrowing by 
foreign currency earners, not the borrowing by local currency earners. 
Overall then our evidence implies that the cost of debt and distress affect the currency 
denomination of small business loans, while firm opaqueness or short-term carry-trade 
motives do not. Hence, employing reasonable (though by no means perfect) firm and 
country proxies, we cannot confirm that information asymmetries or short-term speculation 
drive the recently observed increase in foreign currency borrowing by small firms in Eastern 
European economies. These findings may partly allay some concerns policymakers may 
have on foreign currency borrowing in these countries.
 
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions 
 
Data Sources include: BCJ: Basso et al. (2007); BEEPS: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey in 2005 by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank; IFS: International Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Fund; IR: Index of reform by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; TR: Transition report by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Forex loan 1= last loan of firm was in a foreign currency, 0= last loan of firm was in local currency. BEEPS 
Duration Duration of the loan, in months. BEEPS 
Collateralized 1= yes, 0= no. BEEPS 
Collateral value Measures the value of collateral posted by the firm in percentage of the loan size. BEEPS 
Interest rate Interest rate per annum, in %.  
Exporter 1= firm has export revenues, 0= otherwise. BEEPS 
Sales to multinationals 1= firm has domestic sales to multinational companies, 0= otherwise. BEEPS 
Foreign firm 1= at least 50% of ownership in foreign hands, 0= otherwise. BEEPS 
International accounting 1= firm applies international accounting standards (IAS or USGAAP), 0= otherwise. BEEPS 
Small firm 1= less than 50 employees, 0= otherwise. BEEPS 
Family firm 1= firm is owned by sole proprietor or family, 0= otherwise. BEEPS 
Security costs Expenses for security services in % of sales per year. BEEPS 
Debt Share of short-term investment financed by debt, in %. BEEPS 
Audited firm 1= firm has an external auditor, 0= otherwise. BEEPS 
Income via bank Share of firm revenues that are received through bank transfers. BEEPS 
Age Age of firm in 2005, in years. BEEPS 
Interest diff. Interest rate differential between local currency and foreign currency funds per country, in %.  
Interest diff. – US rate  Domestic lending rate minus US Tbill rate, domestic non-performing loan ratio and depreciation for same observation period. IFS; TR 
Interest diff. – loans Difference in nominal interest rates on 1-year loans: local minus foreign currency rate. BCJ 
Interest diff. – deposits Difference in nominal interest rates on 1-year deposits: local minus foreign currency rate. BCJ 
Exchange rate volatility Variance of monthly changes in the exchange rate versus the US$ (in %) for 12 months prior to beginning of the quarter. IFS 
Inflation volatility Variance of monthly changes in the consumer price index (in %) for 12 months prior to beginning of the quarter. IFS 
Forex deposits Share of deposits in the banking sector denominated in foreign currency, in %. BCJ 
Foreign banks Assets share of foreign controlled banks in domestic banking system, in %. TR 
Foreign liabilities Foreign liabilities of the banking system, in %. BCJ 





Table 2. Loan characteristics: Summary statistics 
 
Forex loan: 1= last loan of firm was in a foreign currency, 0= last loan of firm was in local 
currency. Duration: Duration of the loan, in months. Collateralized: 1= yes, 0= no. Collateral 
value: Measures the value of collateral posted by the firm in percentage of the loan size. Interest 
rate: Interest rate per annum, in %. 
 
Panel A: Sample means by country 
 




value Interest rate 
Albania 81 0.73 37.4 0.96 165 9.5 
Armenia 140 0.29 22.3 0.74 133 14.8 
Azerbaijan 4 0.25 59.0 1.00 163 15.0 
Belarus 79 0.27 19.9 0.89 128 18.0 
Bosnia 94 0.02 35.4 0.97 208 10.2 
Bulgaria 102 0.29 37.6 0.88 144 11.1 
Croatia 130 0.27 49.3 0.80 115 7.6 
Czech Republic 84 0.07 33.3 0.82 108 9.3 
Estonia 69 0.28 51.3 0.90 132 6.7 
Georgia 53 0.66 24.7 0.92 174 18.4 
Hungary 262 0.24 30.5 0.92 155 13.2 
Kazakhstan 232 0.26 28.2 0.96 143 15.9 
Kyrgyzstan 70 0.36 22.6 0.96 186 19.0 
Latvia 84 0.23 40.1 0.92 128 6.8 
Lithuania 69 0.25 32.1 0.84 114 5.7 
Macedonia 35 0.46 20.4 0.94 199 10.9 
Moldova 134 0.25 18.5 0.93 140 20.9 
Poland 306 0.14 29.1 0.79 119 12.6 
Romania 254 0.39 25.3 0.93 143 18.0 
Russia 177 0.12 23.2 0.90 136 17.4 
Serbia 114 0.19 21.0 0.90 174 13.3 
Slovak Rep 64 0.06 39.7 0.83 103 7.6 
Slovenia 125 0.25 40.7 0.60 89 6.3 
Tajikistan 38 0.26 20.5 0.84 151 24.5 
Ukraine 218 0.23 18.8 0.83 160 20.4 
Uzbekistan 87 0.06 20.9 0.77 95 22.8 
Total 3,105 0.25 29.0 0.87 140 14.2 
 
 
Panel B: Sample means by period 
 
Year:Quarter Observations Forex Loan Duration Collateralized 
Collateral 
value Interest 
2002:I 92 0.24 40.94 0.89 142.67 15.36 
2002:II 120 0.28 37.49 0.89 129.81 13.07 
2002:III 56 0.27 34.57 0.88 130.98 15.13 
2002:IV 67 0.25 41.16 0.87 132.06 13.06 
2003:I 142 0.28 30.68 0.89 132.59 15.07 
2003:II 166 0.25 28.16 0.84 142.24 14.26 
2003:III 120 0.28 30.65 0.88 154.46 15.11 
2003:IV 115 0.27 35.63 0.83 130.33 13.15 
2004:I 354 0.21 24.86 0.86 140.87 14.75 
2004:II 441 0.24 26.86 0.88 141.08 14.41 
2004:III 399 0.31 30.39 0.85 144.11 13.83 
2004:IV 489 0.22 27.93 0.88 144.26 14.16 
2005:I 484 0.23 25.19 0.86 134.59 13.73 
2005:II 60 0.22 27.55 0.88 134.04 13.25 
 
 
Panel C: Pairwise correlations 
 Forex Loan Duration  Collateralized Collateral value Interest 
Forex Loan 1.00     
Duration 0.15 1.00    
Collateralized 0.01 0.06 1.00   
Collateral value 0.04 0.00 0.63 1.00  




Table 3. Firm characteristics: Summary statistics 
 
Exporter: 1= firm has export revenues, 0= otherwise. Sales to multinationals: 1= firm has domestic 
sales to multinational companies, 0= otherwise. Foreign firm: 1= at least 50% of ownership in 
foreign hands, 0= otherwise. International accounting: 1= firm applies international accounting 
standards (IAS or USGAAP), 0= otherwise. Small firm: 1= less than 50 employees, 0= otherwise. 
Family firm: 1= firm is owned by sole proprietor or family, 0= otherwise. Security costs: Expenses 
for security services in % of sales per year. Debt: Share of short-term investment financed by debt, 
in %. Audited firm: 1= firm has an external auditor, 0= otherwise. Income via bank: Share of firm 
revenues that are received through bank transfers. Age: Age of firm in 2005, in years. 
 
Panel A: Sample Means by Choice of Loan Denomination 
 
The reported difference tests are standard t-tests. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Total 
Firms w/ local 
currency loan  
Firms w/ foreign 
currency loan 
Difference tests  
Exporter 0.34 0.31 0.43 t(3,101) = 6.25 *** 
Sales to multinationals 0.18 0.17 0.24 t(3,020) = 4.46 *** 
Foreign firm 0.11 0.08 0.20 t(3,105) = 9.03 *** 
International accounting 0.22 0.19 0.31 t(3,105) = 7.16 *** 
      
Small firm 0.61 0.62 0.57 t(3,105) = 2.49 ** 
Family firm 0.72 0.73 0.70 t(3,011) = 1.20  
Security costs 0.74 0.69 0.93 t(3,105) = 3.50 *** 
Debt 38.28 37.83 39.61 t(3,054) = 1.21  
      
Audited firm 0.53 0.51 0.59 t(3,071) = 4.20 *** 
Income via bank 57.17 57.94 54.82 t(3,099) = 1.94 * 
Age 16.91 17.39 15.44 t(3,103) = 2.46 ** 
 
 


































































































Exporter 1           
Sales to multinationals .21 1          
Foreign firm .21 .18 1         
International accounting .18 .11 .16 1        
Small firm -.29 -.07 -.18 -.23 1       
Family firm -.15 -.06 -.27 -.13 .36 1      
Security costs -.02 .04 .02 .03 -.08 -.04 1     
Debt .08 .09 .04 .06 -.04 -.04 .00 1    
Audited firm .19 .16 .18 .20 -.31 -.25 .00 .04 1   
Income via bank .29 .12 .11 .06 -.18 -.16 -.01 .07 .17 1  
Age .22 .01 -.02 .14 -.36 -.32 .00 -.01 .20 .11 1 
 
Table 4. Macroeconomic explanatory variables: Summary statistics 
 
The table displays three measures of the Interest rate differential between local currency and 
foreign currency funds per country, in %. USrate: Domestic lending rate minus US Tbill rate minus 
domestic non-performing loan ratio minus depreciation for same observation period. Loans: 
Interest rate differential on loans. Deposits: Interest rate differential on deposits. The table further 
displays our measures of monetary volatility: Exchange rate volatility: Standard deviation of month 
on month changes in the exchange rate vis-à-vis the US$ for 12 months prior to beginning of the 
quarter, in %. Inflation volatility: Standard deviation of month on month changes in the consumer 
price index for 12 months prior to beginning of the quarter, in %. 
 
 
Panel A: Sample means by country, 2002 – 2005 
 
 Interest diff. 





Albania 19.5 6.3 5.5 9.48 2.03 
Armenia 19.1 0.7 2.4 5.66 5.05 
Azerbaijan -2.5 -2.8 -0.1 0.81 0.76 
Belarus 9.7 7.2 18.4 1.09 1.19 
Bosnia 15.5            
Bulgaria 12.0 3.5 1.0 7.79 1.20 
Croatia 11.0 4.1 1.2 9.09 0.23 
Czech Rep 11.9 1.0 0.0 18.29 0.23 
Estonia 14.3 1.9 0.1 7.71 0.22 
Georgia 25.5 3.4 -3.6 4.30 1.43 
Hungary 16.6 6.8 5.5 9.41 0.32 
Kazakhstan  3.8 1.2 0.93 0.16 
Kyrgyzstan 21.5   6.59 1.05 
Latvia 8.9 3.9 1.2 2.10 0.24 
Lithuania 13.3 1.5 -0.2 7.01 0.21 
Macedonia -6.3 4.6 4.1 8.44 0.53 
Moldova 15.2 9.6 10.1 2.97 1.05 
Poland -6.3 6.0 2.7 10.18 0.13 
Romania  16.6 10.5 4.55 0.32 
Russia 8.1 3.7  1.28 0.39 
Serbia -3.6   7.76 1.76 
Slovak Rep 12.0 1.4 0.8 8.15 1.07 
Slovenia 8.6 3.6 1.4 7.77 0.16 
Tajikistan -10.8 -0.3 0.0          
Ukraine -4.5 7.8 1.6 0.92 0.84 
Uzbekistan             
 
Panel B: Sample means by quarter 
 
 Interest diff. 





2002:I 0.8 4.7 4.5 3.40 1.10 
2002:II 2.4 4.2 3.8 3.13 1.14 
2002:III 8.9 4.3 3.7 3.56 0.95 
2002:IV 5.6 4.5 2.8 3.87 1.05 
2003:I 10.8 3.5 3.4 4.36 0.97 
2003:II 12.4 4.8 3.3 4.50 1.01 
2003:III 9.4 4.4 3.5 7.24 0.86 
2003:IV 10.3 4.2 3.3 9.70 0.79 
2004:I 13.4 4.4 3.2 10.14 0.93 
2004:II 12.5 4.1 2.6 10.51 0.84 
2004:III 8.7 4.1 2.5 8.01 0.86 
2004:IV 9.4 4.0 2.4 5.24 0.72 
2005:I 12.4 4.1 2.2 5.50 0.65 
2005:II 9.4 3.4 1.8 6.69 0.67 
 
 
Panel C: Pairwise correlations 
 Interest diff. 





Interest diff. - USrate  1     
Interest diff. - Loans 0.13 1    
Interest diff. - Deposits 0.02 0.61 1   
Exchange rate volatility 0.14 -0.04 -0.16 1  
Inflation volatility  0.26 -0.05 0.12 -0.02 1 
 
Table 5. Banking sector and institutional variables: Summary statistics 
 
The table displays two measures of dollarization of the economy. Forex deposits: Share of deposits 
in the banking sector denominated in foreign currency, in %. The table further displays two 
measures of foreign presence in the banking system. Foreign banks: Assets share of foreign 
controlled banks in domestic banking system, in %. Foreign liabilities: Foreign liabilities of the 
banking system, in %. Finally, the table reports our measure of the legal environment, Enterprise 
reform: EBRD index of Enterprise reform. 
 
Panel A: Sample means by Country, 2002 – 2005 
 
Country Forex deposits Foreign banks Foreign liabilities Enterprise reform 
Albania 0.31 66.4 0.34 2.0 
Armenia 0.73 53.4 0.75 2.3 
Azerbaijan 0.54 5.3 0.55 1.9 
Belarus 0.55 16.2 0.52 1.0 
Bosnia 0.51 80.8 0.78 1.9 
Bulgaria 0.50 79.1 0.53 2.6 
Croatia 0.66 90.9 0.73 2.8 
Czech Republic 0.11 85.5 0.60 3.3 
Estonia 0.28 97.9 0.81 3.4 
Georgia 0.96 35.1 0.67 2.0 
Hungary 0.16 77.9 0.49 3.4 
Kazakhstan 0.51 28.7 0.79 2.0 
Kyrgyzstan  62.5  2.0 
Latvia 0.40 49.5 0.87 2.9 
Lithuania 0.36 93.8 0.72 3.0 
Macedonia 0.53 46.8 0.58 2.3 
Moldova 0.51 32.9 0.51 1.8 
Poland 0.17 71.6 0.56 3.4 
Romania 0.44 55.9 0.60 2.0 
Russia 0.37 7.8 0.59 2.3 
Serbia 0.63 38.9 0.48 2.0 
Slovak Rep 0.15 93.1 0.57 3.4 
Slovenia 0.33 19.2 0.72 3.0 
Tajikistan 0.56 4.6 0.87 1.7 
Ukraine 0.33 13.5 0.53 2.0 






Panel B: Sample means by quarter 
 
Year:Quarter Forex Deposits Foreign banks Foreign liabilities Enterprise reform 
2002:I 0.49 48.5 0.60 2.4 
2002:II 0.48 48.5 0.61 2.4 
2002:III 0.47 48.5 0.60 2.4 
2002:IV 0.47 48.5 0.61 2.4 
2003:I 0.45 53.3 0.62 2.4 
2003:II 0.44 53.3 0.62 2.4 
2003:III 0.44 53.3 0.62 2.4 
2003:IV 0.43 53.3 0.64 2.4 
2004:I 0.43 55.5 0.65 2.4 
2004:II 0.43 55.5 0.64 2.4 
2004:III 0.43 55.5 0.65 2.4 
2004:IV 0.42 55.5 0.66 2.4 
2005:I 0.43 58.2 0.65 2.5 




Panel C: Pairwise correlations 
 Forex Deposits Foreign banks Foreign liabilities Enterprise reform 
Forex Deposits 1    
Foreign banks -0.34 1   
Foreign liabilities 0.19 0.05 1  




 Table 6. Firm-level determinants of loan denomination 
 
The table reports results of probit estimates. The dependent variable Forex loan equals one if the 
firm's last loan is denominated in foreign currency and zero if this loan is in local currency. All 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Each regression includes six sector dummies. The 
table displays the marginal effects calculated at sample means. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






Exporter 0.075 0.082 0.086 0.094 
 [4.18]*** [4.56]*** [4.75]*** [4.34]*** 
Sales to multinationals 0.044 0.054 0.045 0.040 
 [1.59] [1.83]* [1.54] [1.23] 
Foreign firm 0.179 0.203 0.222 0.25 
 [4.18]*** [4.97]*** [5.33]*** [6.03]*** 
International accounting 0.072 0.046 0.056 0.083 
 [2.18]** [1.59] [1.83]* [2.30]** 
Small firm -0.016 -0.028 -0.041 -0.032 
 [0.58] [0.93] [1.29] [0.84] 
Family firm 0.027 0.028 0.037 0.038 
 [1.00] [1.15] [1.65]* [1.45] 
Security costs 0.013 0.010 0.014 0.016 
 [2.58]*** [2.55]** [3.30]*** [3.71]*** 
Debt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.14] [0.62] [1.31] [1.29] 
Audited firm 0.034 0.010 0.004 0.013 
 [1.03] [0.51] [0.15] [0.48] 
Income via bank -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [2.12]** [0.39] [1.12] [1.53] 
Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 [3.09]*** [2.09]** [2.00]** [2.16]** 
Duration 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 [5.07]*** [5.08]*** [4.57]*** [4.75]*** 
Collateralized 0.022 -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 
 [0.55] [0.32] [0.36] [0.35] 
Observations 2,858 2,858 2,732 2,416 
 
Table 7. Firm-level determinants of loan denomination: Subsamples 
 
The table reports results from probit estimates on subsamples. The dependent variable Forex loan 
equals one if the firm's last loan is denominated in foreign currency and zero if this loan is in local 
currency. Non-forex firms are firms that have no export sales, no sales to multinationals, at most a 
minority foreign owner, and do not adhere to international accounting standards. Forex firms are all 
other firms. Weakly-dollarized economies have a mean share of foreign exchange deposits in the 
banking system that is below 25% for the observation period. Moderate- dollarized economies 
have a mean share of foreign exchange deposits in the banking system that is between 25% and 
50% for the observation period. Strongly-dollarized economies have a mean share of foreign 
exchange deposits in the banking system exceeding 50% for the observation period. are all other 
countries. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Each regression includes six sector 
dummies. The table displays the marginal effects calculated at sample means. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Weakly dollarized Moderate dollarized Strongly dollarized  
 Non-forex 
Firms 
Forex firms Non-forex 
Firms 




Small firm -0.139 -0.014 -0.06 -0.144 0.11 -0.053 
 [0.87] [0.32] [1.12] [1.09] [1.00] [0.55] 
Family firm 0.000 -0.020 0.072 0.053 0.089 -0.104 
 [0.00] [0.39] [1.00] [0.59] [1.56] [1.50] 
Security costs 0.010 0.064 0.014 0.039 0.021 0.010 
 [2.94]*** [3.30]*** [0.90] [1.21] [3.03]*** [0.76] 
Debt 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [2.93]*** [0.57] [0.67] [0.85] [0.87] [1.16] 
Audited firm -0.041 0.09 -0.007 0.049 0.038 0.072 
 [0.66] [1.03] [0.10] [0.94] [0.34] [1.37] 
Income via bank -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 
 [1.60] [0.98] [1.47] [0.93] [0.06] [1.77]* 
Age 0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 
 [0.85] [2.61]*** [1.33] [2.59]*** [1.04] [0.34] 
Duration 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.001 
 [14.52]*** [2.96]*** [2.44]** [6.23]*** [7.55]*** [1.61] 
Collateralized 0.033 -0.188 0.102 -0.031 -0.043 -0.054 
 [0.58] [1.35] [1.00] [0.31] [0.25] [0.68] 
Observations 190 286 416 417 297 476 
 
 
 Table 8. Country-level determinants of loan denomination 
 
The table reports results from probit estimates. The dependent variable Forex loan equals one if the 
firm's last loan is denominated in foreign currency and zero if this loan is in local currency. All 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Each regression includes six sector dummies. The 
table displays the marginal effects calculated at sample means. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Without fixed effects With country fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exporter 0.079 0.111 0.111 0.072 0.105 0.106 
 [3.71]*** [4.29]*** [4.41]*** [3.56]*** [3.96]*** [3.89]*** 
Sales to multinationals 0.045 0.064 0.077 0.051 0.069 0.079 
 [1.21] [1.85]* [2.22]** [1.38] [1.91]* [2.18]** 
Foreign firm 0.214 0.189 0.181 0.234 0.195 0.189 
 [4.01]*** [3.95]*** [3.68]*** [4.64]*** [3.81]*** [3.59]*** 
International accounting 0.065 0.05 0.052 0.058 0.046 0.043 
 [2.06]** [1.39] [1.47] [2.08]** [1.21] [1.10] 
Small firm -0.021 -0.018 -0.019 -0.030 -0.026 -0.029 
 [0.58] [0.53] [0.54] [0.86] [0.76] [0.81] 
Family firm 0.050 0.053 0.039 0.045 0.047 0.037 
 [1.55] [1.48] [1.12] [1.41] [1.40] [1.10] 
Security costs 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.010 
 [1.60] [1.67]* [2.14]** [1.52] [1.58] [1.85]* 
Debt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.68] [0.09] [0.31] [1.19] [0.73] [0.74] 
Audited firm 0.072 0.079 0.075 0.033 0.046 0.047 
 [3.25]*** [3.25]*** [3.40]*** [1.50] [2.53]** [2.49]** 
Income via bank 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.10] [1.39] [2.30]** [0.58] [0.70] [1.14] 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [1.87]* [1.57] [1.73]* [1.65]* [1.14] [1.30] 
Duration 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 [5.45]*** [5.46]*** [5.30]*** [5.07]*** [5.37]*** [5.29]*** 
Collateralized -0.015 0.024 0.035 -0.023 0.010 0.016 
 [0.42] [0.57] [0.81] [0.55] [0.21] [0.33] 
Interest diff. – USrate 0.002   0.000   
 [2.21]**   [0.46]   
Interest diff. – loans  0.007   0.011  
  [2.33]**   [1.44]  
Interest diff. – deposits   0.001   0.007 
   [0.22]   [1.24] 
Exchange rate volatility -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 [2.36]** [1.17] [1.06] [1.44] [1.24] [1.30] 
Inflation volatility 0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 [1.17] [0.55] [0.21] [0.65] [0.57] [0.65] 
Forex deposits 0.193 0.15 0.111 -0.178 -0.006 -0.122 
 [1.08] [0.80] [0.64] [0.35] [0.01] [0.23] 
Foreign banks 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.77] [1.86]* [1.96]* [0.48] [0.83] [0.76] 
Foreign liabilities -0.505 -0.196 -0.234 -0.117 -0.095 -0.140 
 [2.71]*** [1.33] [1.41] [0.52] [0.30] [0.45] 
Enterprise reform -0.052 -0.119 -0.132 -0.12 -0.228 -0.213 
 [0.98] [2.08]** [2.46]** [1.04] [1.69]* [1.60] 
Observations 2,007 1,932 1,975 2,007 1,932 1,975 
 
 
Table 9. Country-level determinants of loan denomination: Subsamples 
 
Panel A reports probit estimates for firms in weakly- or moderate dollarized economies, i.e. 
counties with a mean share of foreign exchange deposits in the banking system that is below 50% 
for the observation period. Panel B reports estimates including only country-periods with a positive 
interest rate differential between local currency and foreign currency funds. The dependent variable 
Forex loan equals one if the firm's last loan is denominated in foreign currency and zero if this loan 
is in local currency. Non-forex firms are firms that have no export sales, no sales to multinationals, 
at most a minority foreign owner, and do not adhere to international accounting standards. Forex 
firms are all other firms. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Each regression includes 
six sector dummies. The table displays the marginal effects calculated at sample means. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Weakly- or moderate dollarized economies 
 
 Non-forex firms Forex firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Small firm -0.034 0.008 0.006 -0.097 -0.086 -0.086 
 [0.74] [0.22] [0.16] [2.33]** [1.64] [1.47] 
Family firm 0.043 0.018 0.011 -0.026 -0.002 -0.008 
 [0.98] [0.40] [0.23] [0.62] [0.06] [0.20] 
Security costs 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.005 0.019 0.040 
 [1.05] [0.51] [0.88] [0.24] [0.88] [1.73]* 
Debt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 [0.73] [0.67] [0.98] [0.90] [0.57] [0.58] 
Audited firm 0.02 0.041 0.053 0.065 0.085 0.087 
 [0.78] [1.65]* [2.00]** [1.14] [1.63] [1.64] 
Income via bank 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 [0.25] [0.67] [2.20]** [1.30] [0.15] [0.09] 
Age 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.00] [0.60] [0.89] [2.71]*** [1.91]* [2.01]** 
Duration 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 [5.38]*** [3.46]*** [3.53]*** [4.88]*** [4.85]*** [5.35]*** 
Collateralized 0.037 0.065 0.094 -0.104 -0.068 -0.071 
 [0.71] [1.24] [1.35] [1.40] [0.75] [0.81] 
Interest diff. – USrate 0.001   0.002   
 [1.62]   [1.70]*   
Interest diff. – loans  0.008   -0.002  
  [2.17]**   [0.42]  
Interest diff. – deposits   0.012   0.002 
   [4.65]***   [0.38] 
Exchange rate volatility 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.002 
 [0.25] [0.00] [0.12] [1.00] [0.65] [0.58] 
Inflation volatility 0.012 0.076 0.088 -0.029 0.078 0.075 
 [0.20] [1.34] [2.01]** [0.40] [1.24] [1.34] 
Forex deposits 0.749 0.202 0.572 0.781 0.901 1.109 
 [2.32]** [0.42] [0.96] [2.49]** [1.92]* [2.57]** 
Foreign banks 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 [0.13] [1.83]* [0.67] [3.27]*** [2.41]** [2.26]** 
Foreign liabilities -0.735 0.024 -0.091 -0.654 -0.47 -0.607 
 [2.71]*** [0.10] [0.30] [3.46]*** [1.94]* [3.05]*** 
Enterprise reform 0.024 -0.119 -0.026 -0.141 -0.087 -0.031 
 [0.31] [1.37] [0.28] [2.16]** [1.05] [0.44] 




Panel B: Strongly dollarized economies 
 
 Non-forex firms Forex firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Small firm 0.102 0.052 0.062 -0.045 -0.110 -0.119 
 [1.30] [0.66] [0.78] [0.51] [1.67]* [1.84]* 
Family firm 0.057 0.033 0.027 -0.036 0.017 0.014 
 [0.93] [0.63] [0.52] [0.41] [0.20] [0.17] 
Security costs 0.02 0.015 0.017 0.007 -0.002 -0.003 
 [2.22]** [2.65]*** [3.16]*** [0.63] [0.35] [0.35] 
Debt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.40] [0.43] [0.74] [0.24] [0.19] [0.20] 
Audited firm 0.053 0.045 0.018 0.116 0.144 0.128 
 [1.23] [0.97] [0.46] [2.45]** [3.47]*** [3.08]*** 
Income via bank 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [1.06] [0.09] [0.44] [0.57] [0.54] [0.66] 
Age -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [1.24] [0.92] [0.88] [0.27] [0.07] [0.05] 
Duration 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [1.81]* [3.62]*** [3.56]*** [1.15] [1.26] [1.26] 
Collateralized -0.006 0.015 0.013 -0.030 -0.008 -0.008 
 [0.05] [0.13] [0.11] [0.43] [0.11] [0.11] 
Interest diff. – USrate 0.002   0.004   
 [0.79]   [1.93]*   
Interest diff. – loans  0.008   0.015  
  [1.24]   [1.48]  
Interest diff. – deposits   -0.008   -0.004 
   [2.38]**   [0.70] 
Exchange rate volatility -0.022 -0.026 -0.027 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 [2.55]** [2.32]** [2.49]** [0.33] [0.19] [0.03] 
Inflation volatility -0.039 -0.041 -0.038 0.019 0.028 0.024 
 [2.29]** [2.76]*** [3.00]*** [1.40] [2.20]** [1.82]* 
Forex deposits 0.614 0.753 0.666 0.323 0.389 0.325 
 [2.05]** [2.49]** [2.72]*** [1.21] [1.86]* [1.62] 
Foreign banks 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.003 0.003 
 [0.09] [2.50]** [4.14]*** [1.71]* [1.62] [1.35] 
Foreign liabilities -0.365 -0.342 -0.578 -0.177 0.050 -0.194 
 [1.14] [2.39]** [4.27]*** [0.60] [0.19] [1.11] 
Enterprise reform 0.070 0.164 0.131 -0.364 -0.234 -0.247 
 [0.92] [2.92]*** [2.17]** [2.00]** [2.11]** [1.65]* 
Observations 271 385 385 418 434 434 
 
 
Figure 1. Loan Currency Choice by Local Currency Earning Firms (L Firms) 
 
The figure displays the distress costs of the marginal local currency firm that chooses 
a foreign currency loan as a function of the interest rate differential. The blue line 
displays the distress costs of the marginal firm under perfect information. The red line 
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